THE MEANING OF BUSH V. GORE: THOUGHTS ON PROFESSOR
AMAR’S ANALYSIS
Erwin Chemerinsky*
It is tempting to blame the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in Bush v. Gore for the evils the Bush Administration inflicted on the
nation. If only Al Gore had become president, there would not have
been the disastrous war in Iraq or the enormous deficit-spending to fund
it, which has contributed to the worst economic problems since the
Great Depression. If only Al Gore had become president, the responses
in the War on Terror would have been more measured and would not
have included torture and indefinite detentions without due process. If
only Al Gore had become president, then Justices William Rehnquist
and Sandra Day O’Connor would have been replaced by individuals far
more moderate than Justices John Roberts and Samuel Alito.
From the lens of 2009, after eight years of the Bush presidency, the
consequences of Bush v. Gore are worse than it could have seemed on
December 12, 2000, when the decision came down.1 Of course, the
problem with this way of looking at Bush v. Gore is that George W.
Bush might well have become president even if the U.S. Supreme Court
never had become involved or had affirmed the Florida Supreme
Court’s ruling. Counting all of the uncounted votes (what Gore urged)
might have led to a Bush victory anyway. Also, if the Court stayed out
of it, the political process ultimately may well have resolved the matter
in Bush’s favor.
Professor Akhil Amar’s focus is not on these practical consequences
of Bush v. Gore, but instead on the judicial opinions. He persuasively
explains why the Florida Supreme Court’s decision was at least
reasonable, if not correct, and why the majority of the U.S. Supreme
Court got it wrong. I agree with him. However, I want to focus on the
larger question: What does Bush v. Gore tell us about judicial review
and the judicial power?
For decades, conservatives have attacked what they perceive as
illegitimate judicial activism. The 2008 Republican platform declares:
“Judicial activism is a grave threat to the rule of law because
unaccountable federal judges are usurping democracy, ignoring the
Constitution and its separation of powers, and imposing their personal
opinions upon the public. This must stop.”2 And conservatives, such as
Justice Antonin Scalia, purport to pursue a method of analysis having
no relationship to the views or ideology.
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1. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 98 (2000).
2. 2008 Republican Party Platform, http://www.gop.com/2008 Platform/GovernmentRef
orm.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
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This picture of judging has great rhetorical force. At his
confirmation hearings for Chief Justice, John Roberts proclaimed that:
“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply
them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure
everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went
to a ball game to see an umpire.”3 The power of this conservative
rhetoric also was seen in Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s recent confirmation
hearings where she repeatedly told the members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee that judges must “apply not make the law.”4
Conservatives thus claim that they have a method of judicial
decision-making which is neutral and even formalistic, and that liberals
make it up. This would be a laughable claim, except for its tremendous
rhetorical power. I have participated in countless debates over
originalism over the years and inevitably its proponents argue that
originalists have a theory, while opponents of originalism have none. At
the very least, conservatives do have slogans—“judges are umpires,”
“judges should apply not make the law,” “judges should follow the law
not their personal views”—that have so much rhetorical force that even
Democratic nominees for the U.S. Supreme Court repeat them.
It is here that Bush v. Gore and Professor Amar’s critique of it is so
important: Bush v. Gore is a powerful example of how decision-making
occurs in constitutional cases. Although unusual in its national
significance, Bush v. Gore is typical in terms of two crucial points: first,
Justices have tremendous discretion in deciding constitutional cases;
and second, how that discretion is exercised is frequently, if not
inevitably, a product of the Justices’ life experiences and ideology.
Neither of these propositions should be the least bit controversial,
except that they are vehemently denied by conservatives, such as the
Republican Senators who opposed and voted against Justice Sonia
Sotomayor. Therefore, because it shows that all Justices, liberal or
conservative, come to results based on their views and ideology, Bush v.
Gore should be used to forever bury silly adages like “judges are
umpires who don’t make the rules, but apply them” and “judges should
apply the law, not make it.”

3. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
4. Peter Baker and Neil A. Lewis, Sotomayor Vows ‘Fidelity to the Law’ as Hearings
Start, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at A1.
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THE COURT’S DISCRETION IN BUSH V. GORE
Bush v. Gore is a perfect illustration of the enormous discretion that
Justices have in constitutional cases. This would seem so obvious as to
not require elaboration except that it is the crucial flaw in the
conservative rhetoric about constitutional decision-making: ignorance
of the inevitably large discretion that exists in constitutional decisionmaking.
Using Bush v. Gore as an example, discretion existed at countless
levels. Initially, the Court had total discretion as to whether to hear the
case at all. This came to the U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari and that,
of course, is entirely in the discretion of the Justices; if four Justices
vote to grant certiorari, the Court hears the case, otherwise it does not.
The Justices could have simply decided to stay out of the matter entirely
and let the matter work its way through the Florida courts and the
political process.
Once the Court decided to grant certiorari, it then had to decide
whether to stay the counting of the uncounted ballots. Interestingly,
Professor Amar does not mention this in his Dunwody Lecture. But I
believe that this was a crucial moment in the Bush v. Gore litigation. If
the Court had not granted a stay, all of the uncounted ballots were to
have been counted by 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, December 10, the day
before the oral arguments in Bush v. Gore. Had the counting shown
Bush ahead, the Gore challenge would have been moot. But had the
counting shown Gore ahead in Florida, it would have been far more
difficult for the U.S. Supreme Court to find the recounting
impermissible.
As Professor Amar rightly points out, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Bush v. Gore premised its decision on Florida’s desire to determine its
electors by the safe harbor of December 12, 2000.5 But if the counting
had been completed on December 10, this concern would have been
nonexistent. In other words, it often has been overlooked that the
Court’s central reason for stopping the recount, the need to be done by
December 12, was entirely of its own making when it granted the stay
of the counting on December 9.6
The Court had complete discretion whether to stay the counting.
Under traditional principles of equity, a stay requires a finding of
5. Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution, 61 FLA. L. REV. 945,
947–48 (2009); Bush, 531 U.S. at 111 (“Because the Florida Supreme Court has said that the
Florida Legislature intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5, Justice Breyer’s
proposed remedy—remanding to the Florida Supreme Court for its ordering of a constitutionally
proper contest until December 18-contemplates action in violation of the Florida Election Code,
and hence could not be part of an ‘appropriate’ order authorized by [Florida Statute §
102.168(8)].”).
6. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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irreparable injury and a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the
merits.7 What was the irreparable injury to allowing the counting to
continue? The U.S. Supreme Court issued no opinion justifying the stay.
But Justice Antonin Scalia, writing only for himself, issued an opinion
on December 9 explaining the stay.8 He said that Bush met the
requirements for a stay: showing a substantial likelihood of prevailing
on the merits and irreparable injury.9 Justice Scalia identified two
injuries.10 First, Justice Scalia said that counting the uncounted votes
risked placing a cloud over the legitimacy of a Bush presidency.11 In
other words, if the counting put Gore ahead, but the U.S. Supreme
Court disallowed it, there would be doubts about the legitimacy of
Bush’s presidency. However, such speculation as to political fallout
hardly seems to meet the legal requirement for “irreparable injury.”
Maybe the counting would have put a cloud over the Bush presidency,
or maybe people would have just accepted Bush as President anyway.
The reality is by halting the counting, the U.S. Supreme Court still put a
cloud over the Bush presidency. For those who voted for Gore on
November 7, there always will be a cloud over the Bush presidency; for
those who voted for Bush, they always will be thrilled that their
candidate won. It is hard to turn this into irreparable injury.
Second, Justice Scalia said that counting the ballots would cause
them to degrade, and thus prevent a more accurate count at a later
date.12 The problem with this argument is that there was nothing in the
record to support Justice Scalia’s assertion about degradation of ballots.
He just made it up. Moreover, it was a disingenuous concern—the Court
stayed the counting so as to protect a more accurate later counting that it
prevented from occurring.
My point is simply that the Court had complete discretion whether to
grant the stay. Even after it took the case and even after it granted the
stay, the Court had discretion as to whether to decide the merits or
dismiss the case as non-justiciable. As I have argued elsewhere, I
believe also that the Court erred by not dismissing on ripeness and
perhaps on political question doctrine grounds.13
At the very least, the Court had discretion as to whether the issues
before the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore were ripe for review.
The central issue was whether the counting of votes would deny equal
7. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1047 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
8. Id. at at 1046–47.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1047.
12. Id.
13. Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1093, 1102–09 (2001).
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protection.14 There would be a constitutional violation only if similar
ballots were treated differently in the counting process. But it could not
be known if this would occur until the counting occurred and the trial
judge in Florida, Judge Terry Lewis, ruled on all of the challenges. Until
then, it was purely speculative as to whether there would be a problem
with similar ballots being treated differently.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in its per curiam opinion, focused on
inequalities that already had occurred. The per curiam opinion points to
differences in the Miami-Dade County and the Palm Beach County
counting.15 But the counting that already had been done was not the
issue before the U.S. Supreme Court. The only issue was whether the
counting should continue. Prior experience was not predictive of what
was to occur because of a key change: a single judge was overseeing the
counting under the Florida Supreme Court’s decision. This judge was to
hear all of the disputes and potentially could eliminate any inequalities
by applying a uniform standard.
Justice Stevens emphasized exactly this point in his dissent.16 He
wrote: “Admittedly, the use of differing substandards for determining
voter intent in different counties employing similar voting systems may
raise serious concerns. Those concerns are alleviated—if not
eliminated—by the fact that a single impartial magistrate will ultimately
adjudicate all objections arising from the recount process.”17 Justice
Stevens, however, did not draw a key conclusion from his
observation—the challenge to the counting was not ripe for review.
Only after the counting was completed could the parties claim that there
was inequality and thus a constitutional violation.
Phrased another way, the U.S. Supreme Court improperly treated an
“as applied” equal protection challenge as if it were a facial challenge.18
Bush was not arguing that the Florida election law was unconstitutional
on its face. Neither in the briefs nor in the oral argument did Bush’s
lawyers suggest such a facial attack. Rather, Bush argued that counting
without uniform standards denied equal protection. This would be an
equal protection violation only if, after the counting and the resolution
of disputes by the judge, similar ballots were treated differently. But
that could not possibly be known until all the ballots were counted.
Until then, it would be purely speculative as to whether there would be
a denial of equal protection.
Bush v. Gore was not ripe for an even more basic reason: George W.
Bush might well have ended up ahead after the counting. In that event,
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109–10 (2000).
Id. at 106–07; Amar, supra note 5, at 961–62.
531 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1103.
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there obviously would have been no need for the U.S. Supreme Court to
decide this appeal. The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that a case is
not ripe when it is unknown whether the injury will be suffered.
Bush v. Gore was not ripe for review on December 9, when the stay
was issued,19 or December 11, when the case was heard,20 or December
12, when the case was decided.21 The case would have been ripe only
after all the counting was done if: a) Gore came out ahead in Florida,
and b) Bush could present evidence of inequalities in how the ballots
were actually counted. Unless and until these eventualities occurred, the
case was not ripe and should have been dismissed.
Again, my point here is just that the Court had discretion as to
whether to dismiss the case on ripeness grounds. It also might have
found the matter to be a political question—it after all was
quintessentially and profoundly political—and dismissed the case on
that basis.
Even after taking the case, halting the counting, and finding the case
justiciable, the Court still had great discretion. Does the risk of counting
similar ballots with different standards violate equal protection?
Professor Amar describes this as “exuberant and unprecedented equal
protection analysis.”22 Professor Amar forcefully explains the problems
in the majority’s equal protection approach.23 At the very least,
Professor Amar clearly demonstrates that reasonable Justices could
have gone either way on the issue of whether there was an equal
protection violation.
Even after the Court took the case, halted the recount, found the
matter justiciable, and determined that equal protection was violated, it
still had discretion as to the remedy. The case could have been
remanded to the Florida courts to decide whether, under Florida law, to
halt the recount to meet the safe harbor of December 12 or whether to
continue the recount with uniform standards for counting the uncounted
ballots. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the choice to end the
recount was entirely based on its interpretation of Florida law and its
desire to have the electors decided by December 12. But it is well
established that state courts are to get the last word as to the meaning of
state law. This obviously was a situation that had never arisen in Florida
and so the Florida courts had never ruled as to how this tension—
meeting the safe harbor as opposed to making sure that all of the votes
were counted—was to be resolved.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 98.
Id.
Id.
Amar, supra note 5, at 965.
See Amar, supra note 5, at 960–64.
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The U.S. Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion made two arguments.
First, counting the uncounted votes without standards violates equal
protection. Second, Florida law prevented the counting from continuing
past December 12. This second point is indispensable to the Court’s
decision to end the counting. Assuming that there were inequalities in
the counting that violated the Constitution, there were two ways to
remedy this situation: count none of the uncounted ballots or count all
of the ballots with uniform standards. The latter would involve
remanding the case to the Florida Supreme Court for development of
standards and for such relief as that court deemed appropriate.
It must be emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court did not hold that
federal law prevented the counting from continuing. The only reason for
not remanding the case was the Court’s judgment that Florida law
prevented this.24 In two paragraphs near the end of the per curiam
opinion, the Court explained why it was stopping the counting:
The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the
legislature intended the State’s electors to “participat[e]
fully in the federal electoral process,” as provided in 3
U.S.C. § 5. . . . That statute, in turn, requires that any
controversy or contest that is designed to lead to a
conclusive selection of electors be completed by December
12. That date is upon us, and there is no recount procedure
in place under the State Supreme Court’s order that
comports with minimal constitutional standards. Because it
is evident that any recount seeking to meet the December
12 date will be unconstitutional for the reasons we have
discussed, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Florida ordering a recount to proceed.
Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are
constitutional problems with the recount ordered by the
Florida Supreme Court that demand a remedy. . . . The only
disagreement is as to the remedy. Because the Florida
Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature
intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5,
Justice Breyer’s proposed remedy—remanding to the
Florida Supreme Court for its ordering of a constitutionally
proper contest until December 18—contemplates action in
violation of the Florida Election Code, and hence could not
be part of an “appropriate” order authorized by Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 102.168(8) (Supp. 2001).25
This reasoning is recited at length to show that the sole reason the
Court gave for ending the counting was based on its interpretation of
24. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 98 (2000).
25. Id. at 110–11.
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Florida law. However, no Florida statute stated or implied that the
counting had to be done by December 12. The sole authority for the
Supreme Court’s conclusion was one statement by the Florida Supreme
Court.
However, that statement was made in a very different context and at
a time when the Florida Supreme Court was not faced with the issue
posed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling. After the U.S. Supreme
Court decided on December 12 that the counting without standards
violated equal protection, the issue was what remedy was appropriate
under Florida law: continue the counting past December 12 or end the
counting to meet the December 12 deadline. The Supreme Court could
not possibly know how the Florida Supreme Court would resolve this
issue because it had never occurred before. However, prior Florida
decisions emphasized the importance of making sure that every vote is
accurately counted.26 The Florida Supreme Court might have relied on
this precedent to continue the counting past December 12. Alternatively,
the Florida Supreme Court might have ended the counting, treating
December 12 as a firm deadline in Florida.
Indeed, after Bush v. Gore was decided, the Florida Supreme Court
issued a decision dismissing the case.27 Justice Shaw, in a concurring
opinion, declared:
[I]n my opinion, December 12 was not a “drop-dead” date
under Florida law. In fact, I question whether any date prior
to January 6 is a drop-dead date under the Florida election
scheme. December 12 was simply a permissive “safeharbor” date to which the states could aspire. It certainly
was not a mandatory contest deadline under the plain
language of the Florida Election Code . . . .28
Perhaps a majority of the Florida Supreme Court would have
followed this view, perhaps not. The point is that this was a question of
Florida law to be decided by the Florida Supreme Court. Of course, it is
clearly established that state supreme courts get the final word as to the
interpretation of state law. From a federalism perspective, it is
inexplicable why the five Justices in the majority—usually the
advocates of states’ rights on the Court—did not remand the case to the
Florida Supreme Court to decide under Florida law whether the
counting should continue.
26. See, e.g., State ex rel. Millinor v. Smith, 144 So. 333, 335 (Fla. 1932) (“The right to a
correct count of the ballots in an election is a substantial right which it is the privilege of every
candidate for office to insist on, in every case where there has been a failure to make a proper
count. . . .”).
27. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam), rev’d per curiam sub nom.
Bush II, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
28. Id. at 128–29 (Shaw, J., concurring).

2009]

DUNWODY COMMENTARY

977

Again, at the very least, Bush v. Gore demonstrates that the Court
had discretion, choices that could have gone either way, on whether to
take the case, whether to halt the recount, whether to find the matter
justiciable, whether to conclude that equal protection was violated, and
whether to end the counting or send the matter back to the Florida
courts. Although I believe that the Court was wrong at each step, here I
only seek to show that there was discretion; mechanical judging was
impossible.
THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION REFLECTS THE JUSTICES’ VALUES
AND IDEOLOGY
I am continually stunned to hear conservatives defend a view of
judging that purports to exclude any importance of a Justice’s
background, values, and ideology. How can any person decide what is
“reasonable” in the context of the Fourth Amendment or what is
“compelling” in applying strict scrutiny except by making a value
choice? This does not mean that the choices are based on whim or
caprice. They are influenced by what has been deemed reasonable or
compelling in other cases and by the arguments presented by counsel.
But ultimately, it is still inescapably a value choice to be made.
Bush v. Gore is irrefutable evidence of this point. Republicans,
including the five in the majority on the U.S. Supreme Court, took
Bush’s side in the litigation; Democrats, including the two on the U.S.
Supreme Court, took Gore’s. Professor Amar briefly reviews the
partisan breakdown among the scholarly literature, mentioning critics of
the decision as including liberal law professors like Margaret Jane
Radin, Mark Kelman, Robert Gordon, Derrick Bell, Jeb Rubenfeld, and
Jack Balkin.29 Professor Amar also quotes defenders of the decision as
including Richard Epstein, Michael McConnell, and Charles Fried.30
Surely, this political division is not coincidence. I have often speculated
that if the results had come out differently in Florida (if it was Gore who
was ahead by a slim margin and it was Bush who wanted a recount), the
sides would have simply flipped.
Some have suggested that Bush v. Gore was a baldly partisan choice
by Republican Justices to make the Republican candidate the next
President. Vincent Bugliosi advanced this view and even argued for
impeachment of the Justices in the Bush v. Gore majority.31
I believe, however, that the role of politics was more subtle and more
profound. On Friday, December 8, after the Florida Supreme Court
ordered the counting of uncounted votes, everyone I knew who voted
29. Amar, supra note 5, at 947–49.
30. Amar, supra note 5, at 949–51.
31. VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
UNDERMINED THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE OUR PRESIDENT 1 (2001).
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for Gore praised the decision, and everyone I knew who voted for Bush
decried the ruling. I immediately said that there was no reason to think
that the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court would be any different.
In fact, it would have been much easier for the dissenting Justices on
the Court and the liberal law professors to embrace the equal protection
argument. Part of the irony of Bush v. Gore is that it was virtually the
only case in which Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas found an equal
protection violation, except in striking down affirmative action
programs.
In other words, it was not that the five Justices in the majority set out
to make sure that Bush became President, and the four dissenters acted
to make sure that Gore was President. I truly believe that each of the
nine Justices deeply believed that he or she was making a ruling on the
law, not on partisan grounds. But how each saw the case was entirely a
product of the Justices’ biases and views.
This decision has profound implications for how we think about the
law. We are all result-oriented, consciously or unconsciously, much of
the time. We come to conclusions and then look for arguments to
support them. We constantly hear criticisms of judges or academics for
being result-oriented. Yet there is no way to avoid this. The premises
we begin with influence, if not determine, the conclusions we come to.
Bush v. Gore unquestionably seemed a result-oriented decision in the
sense that the nine Justices each came to a result that was consistent
with their political views, so far as we know them. That does not mean
that it was corrupt or even unique among judicial decisions. In the vast
majority of important cases, the Justices’ conclusions are a reflection of
the views with which they started.
CONCLUSION
Bush v. Gore was a unique moment in American history: the only
time in which the U.S. Supreme Court has played a direct role in
deciding a presidential election. It is therefore a decision and a series of
events that warrant reexamination, especially with the benefit of time
and hindsight. Professor Amar’s excellent analysis of what happened
does exactly this.
My point, however, has been that the case also stands for something
more basic in the never ending debate over judicial review: Justices
have great discretion and how they exercise that discretion is a product
of their life experiences, values, and ideology. It is long past time to get
past disingenuous slogans like “judges are umpires” and “judges should
apply not make the law.” Keeping Bush v. Gore in mind is a large step
in this direction.

